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THE THEORY OF COMMODITY PRICE
STABILISATION RULES: WELFARE IMPACTS AND
SUPPLY RESPONSES*
Commodity price stabilisation schemes are again topical, this time as a result of
pressure from UNCTAD for an integrated programme on commodities as part
of the 'New International Order'. Despite the long history of interest in the
subject and its evident importance for developing countries the conventional
analysis of the impact of price stabilisation is remarkably simplistic.^ The theory
was developed by Waugh (1944), Oi (1961), and Massell (1969) and provides
the basis for most subsequent theoretical investigations (of which some are
presented in the references and surveyed in Turnovsky, 1978^) and empirical
estimates (e.g. MacAvoy and McNicol, 1976; World Bank, 1977). The Waugh-
Oi-Massell approach assumes 'linear demand and supply schedules, instan-
taneous reaction of supply and demand to changes in market prices, additive
stochastic disturbances and price stabilisation at the mean of the prices which
would have prevailed in an unstabilised market' (World Bank, 1977), as shown
in Fig. I.
Additive stochastic disturbances are the natural specification for the esti-
mation of linear demand and supply equations such as
Q'^ = a — bp + u demand, \
(0
Q" = c + dp + v supply, ]
where u, iT are stochastic error terms. In such a case the inverse demand and
supply .schedules graphed in Fig. 1 vary without altering their slope, so that
.92^ 2 is parallel to S^S^ but horizontally displaced.
Most of the 'core' commodities which UNCTAD is concerned to stabilise are
agricultural commodities for which this model is most unsatisfactory, for the
following reasons:
(i) Additive disturbances imply that bad weather has the same absolute
impact on supply regardless of the acreage of the crop planted, whereas a more
natural specification would make disturbances proportional to potential yield.^
(ii) Linearity implies that it is feasible to stabilise prices at their mean, in
which case average supply will not change. If, as seems likely, demand or supply
schedules are non-linear such price stabilisation will be infeasible - the buffer
• The work reported in tliis paper was supported by the World Bank, under research project 671-09
and we are grateful to C. Blitzor, A. Braverman, and their colleagues, and also to F. Allen and the
referee for perceptive comments. Naturally, the paper should not be interpreted as reflecting their's
or the Bank's views.
1 With a few exceptions, such as Samuelson (197a) and Turnovsky {1976).
* A point made with convincing arguments by Hazell and Scandizzo (1975).
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Fig. 1. Price stabilisation with additive risk.
Stock would Steadily accumulate or decumulate. We shall argue that the
emphasis on prices has been misplaced, and that it is more logical to work in
terms of quantities.1
(iii) There is no distinction made between ex~ante and ex-post supply curves.
In practice, a large part of the costs of producing crops are incurred before the
weather is known, and certainly before the market price has been established.
The supply schedule at harvest time is thus virtually vertical, with its location
depending both on the weather, and on the level of inputs already chosen. It is
therefore inappropriate to measure producers' profits as the area between the
supply schedule and the price line (e.g. area Ap^B in Fig. i) as this requires
costs to be the area below the supply schedule [OABQ^] and for these to vary with
the weather. It might be relatively simple to relate ex~post supply to planned or
ex-ante average supply, Q, by, for example, replacing equation (1) with
but in general it is not possible to express average supply as a function of the
expected price, since producers choose inputs with an eye to the expected return,
which is in general not equal to the product of expected output and expected
price. The model is therefore misleading both as a positive description of market
equilibrium and for a normative measure of producer benefit.
(lv) The welfare analysis of consumers is similarly suspect when shifts in
demand are a contributory cause of variability. A fall in demand leads to a
decrease in the area of the Marshallian triangle which is taken as the measure of
consumers' welfare, but if the fall is a result of a decrease in the price of a substitute
then consumers will in fact be better off. Unless the source of price variability is
carefully specified it is impossible to measure its impact on consumers.
• Waugh (1966) and Wegge, Sosnick and George (1971) consider the case where the price b stabil-
ised at some weighted average, whilst Samuelson (1972) argues the general infeasibiHty of stabilising
at the mean price.
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(v) Most of the advocates of price stabilisation argue that reducing price
variability is good in itself. If this leads to reduced income variability with no
change in the mean income of producers then production risk will fall and risk
averse producers will indeed be better off. However, income variability will not
necessarily decrease with price stabilisation (especially if the elasticity of demand is
low) and there is no guarantee that mean incomes will remain unchanged. Even
if all these conditions are satisfied, the measurement of Marshallian triangles
completely ignores this supposedly major benefit.
(vi) The conventional analysis contrasts no stabilisation with perfect,
costless price stabilisation. Perfect price stabiUty would require an infinite buffer
stock to remain indefinitely feasible, and would thus be infinitely costly. In
general, incomplete stabilisation will be desirable, but the model is not well
suited to analysing partial stabilisation.^
(vii) If, as is likely, price stabilisation changes the average retum then
producers will gradually learn of this and adjust their inputs. The long run
impact of stabilisation may be quite different from its immediate impact as a
result of this supply response. The model, however, predicts no change in
average supply, Q.
(viii) If farmers differ in their attitudes to risk then price stabilisation may
affect them differentially, for it will affect both average incomes and their
riskiness, possibly in different directions. The model is squarely in the Marshallian
tradition of the representative producer, and is therefore silent on distributional
issues.
It is the aim of this paper to suggest an alternative framework for the analysis
of commodity stabilisation schemes, based on more secure micro-economic
foundations. We begin with what might be termed the general theory of partial
(or incomplete) price stabilisation. This meets objection (vi) above, and shows
how the shape of" the demand schedule and the source and specification of risk
influence the size and distribution of welfare gains. It therefore allows the reader
to appreciate the importance of the more detailed model specification which is
required to investigate the remaining questions. This new model allows one to
distinguish between the short run and long run impact of stabilisation, and to
examine the importance of risk aversion and individual supply elasticity on the
distribution of gains and losses from partial stabilisation.
Obviously, it is impossible to provide a complete theory of commodity price
stabilisation within the confines of a single, brief paper, and the work presented
here is indeed a small (but central) part of a more comprehensive study. In
particular, we do not discuss the dynamics of price stabilisation in the paper
(price expectations, learning, the stochastic nature of buffer stocks, etc.), nor do
we model demand uncertainty, the macro-economic impact of risk and stabilisa-
tion, market imperfections, interactions with future markets, private speculators,
with other commodities, and a host of other important issues. For these, and for
a more detailed exposition of some of the key concepts presented here, the
^ Turnovsky (1978a) examines a simple parameterisation of a partial stabilisation scheme, but
restricts the analysis to the linear Waugh-Oi-Massell case.
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interested reader is referred to our forthcoming book (Newbery and Stiglitz,
1980). Finally, we should point out that the buffer stock rules analysed here are
not optimal rules, which can only be derived from a complete dynamic analysis,
as derived and discussed in the book.
1. THE GENERAL THEORY OF
PARTIAL PRICE STABILISATION
A price stabilisation scheme is any programme that leads to a reduction in the
dispersion of price. Several measures or definitions of price dispersion have been
employed, notably that of the coefficient of variation, but Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970) have shown these to have important limitations. They introduced the
concept o?mean-preserving spreads and demonstrated the coherence this gave to the
study of risk. The key issue is which variable to use in the analysis. Most writers
have implicitly used a mean-price preserving decrease in price variability, but
argument (ii) above showed this to be inappropriate because it is infeasible. The
appropriate concept is a mean-quantity preserving decrease in price dispersion, which is
feasible and easy to interpret. It is affected by transferring (by storage, which we
assume occurs without wastage) a unit of output from a date at which price is
low to a date when it is high. Thus, if A = A(Q'^ ) is the price at date i when
consumption is Q*^, and if
Pi > p2




is less dispersed than the original distribution, provided SQ is small enough and
if demand at i is independent of price atj. (Demand for storage, as opposed to
consumption, will obviously depend on prices at different dates. Since we are
assuming that only the buffer agency engages in storage it seems reasonable to
assume intertemporally independent demand, though for a full analysis of
commodity stabilisation schemes the responses of private speculators should be
investigated. See Newbery and Stiglitz, 1980.)
Fig. 2 illustrates the effect of a mean output preserving transfer on the price
distribution. The probability density functions are graphed on the axes, and
show the effect of a shift of SQ from Q^  to Q^. Q^ occurs less often, because it
becomes Q^-SQ, and Q^ also occurs less often, becoming Q1 + 8Q, hence com-
pressing the distribution whilst leaving the mean unchanged. The price distri-
bution is derived from the supply distribution via the demand curve.^
* We assume the demand schedule is stable and downward sloping. If demand is variable a less
disperse price distribution may correspond to a more disperse distribution of consumption.
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Fig. 2. Mean output preserving decrease in variability.
II. THE WELFARE EFFECT OF STABILISATION
We ask what effect this transfer has on the three interested parties: consumers,
the storage agency, and producers. Of these, the easiest to measure is the effect on
the income of the buffer stock, which is at date t
Q" is supply, which varies from date to date, but is assumed unaffected by the
transfer, whilst Q*^ is consumption, which will be affected by the actions of the
buffer agency, as will the market clearing price. The impact on the buffer stock




where A is the difference operator which takes the difference of the value in
brackets between dates i and 2. Hence
n. (3)
assuming zero storage and interest costs. (Such costs will, of course, have to be
estimated if the optimal amount of price stabilisation is to be identified. See
Newbery and Stiglitz (1980) for a full treatment of optimal stockholding rules.)
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For producers the transfer of ^ Q makes no difference to their sales, Q\ but it does
alter the price by an amount
|*«=-i*<?' (4)
where e is the price elasticity of demand for consumption, Q" (measured as a
positive number). Since we are holding mean quantity constant producers do not
change their purchases of inputs, so the change in their utility is simply
where u'{y) is the marginal utility of farmer's income, y, and at date i
Since inputs are held constant, combining equations (4) and (5) gives
or the cash value of producer's benefit^ is
where E is the expectations operator, taking the average of the values of terms to
its right at the two dates.2 The first term is the risk benefit, the benefit of transferring
income from periods of low to periods of high marginal utility, whilst the second
term is the transfer effect, the value of the change in average income received.
The remaining participants are consumers, whose welfare is best measured by
the indirect utility function V{p, I), where / is consumer income. As before
By Roy's identity
with the obvious subscript notation for partial derivatives, so consumer benefits
5^, are
All three expressions give the cash value of the welfare effect of the price stabilising
transfer, since they are deflated by the average value of the marginal utility of
income, and to that extent they are comparable. Notice, first of all, the remarkable
* Defined as the amount the producer would be willing to pay to have the price variability reduced
in the given way.
* Note that A{xy) = x^y^-x^y^
= A(;c) £ff-|-A(y) Ex.
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result, that if we ignore the terms involving changes in marginal utility (Au' and
, then the sum of all three benefits is simply
Thus, if we would ignore the effect of stabilisation on the marginal utility of
incomes (that is, the distributional impacts) the benefits of price stabilisation are
simply the benefits of arbitrage, that is, of moving consumption from dates of low
value (low price) to dates of high value. If this could be achieved costlessly, then
perfect price stabilisation is desirable, but since it is both costly and ultimately
infeasible, perfect stabilisation is neither desirable nor possible.
There is another way of expressing the benefits of stabilisation. The sum of
changes in producer and buffer stock income is
where X*^ - pQ'^ is consumers' expenditure on the commodity. If we notionally
aggregate buffer profits with producers then any increase in producers' income
is matched by an equal increase in consumers' expenditure. If we again ignore
the effect of change in price on the marginal utility of consumers' income^ (the
last term of equation (7)), then
Thus the cash value of price stabilisation to consumers (dividing by the marginal
utility of income to express the result in money terms) is the sum of the transfer
to producers and the buffer stock plus an arbitrage effect of transferring goods from
dates of low value to dates of high value.
Notice that we cannot sign the overall impact on consumers without specifying
the functional form. This is in contrast to the general view which states that since
the indirect utility function is convex in prices, price stabilisation harms con-
sumers. The result depends on an unchanged mean price, whereas our basic
contention is that there is no reason to expect mean price to remain constant.
These various general formulae provide the basis for the detailed analysis of
special cases. Consider first the effect of a little stabilisation, starting from no
stabilisation.
(1) The effects of a small amount of stabilisation
Initially supply equals demand, so Q^ = Q"^. The transfer term from producers
is then /A\
(f)Q. (8)
which is negative if the elasticity of demand is constant. If, on the other hand,
demand is linear and there is no change in the slope of the demand curve, - b
(additive risk), the transfer term is
^8Q= ~bA{Q)8Q>o.
• I.e. v/e assume V,j, is negligible. This is reasonable if X"/! is small, and for most primary com-
modities this ratio is less than i %.
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This immediately demonstrates the importance of choosing between linear and
log-linear specifications. Either way, the cash value of the transfer effect is
exactly equal to and opposite in sign to the cash value to consumers. There
remain as net benefits the buffer profits and the risk benefit. The latter is found
from the expression for the marginal utility of income, itself a function of supply
(= demand). Expanding about mean quantity, Q, gives
If the degree of relative risk aversion is R,^ where
then
so, if i? and e are constants,
and the risk benefit is, for the constant elasticity case
whose sign depends on whether demand is elastic or not. The transfer effect, in
the constant elasticity case, is
which is always negative. The total impact on producers is
Thus unless risk aversion is large and demand inelastic, the net effect will be
negative.
(2) The effects of a small destabilisation from perfect stabilisation
Here the simplification changes from Q' = Qnop=P = p[Q)^ Qc = Q^ provided
that the source of variability is on the supply side. The producers' transfer term
IS now
Strictly speaking we should distinguish between revenue, pQ, and income, which includes sources
other than the sale of the crop, and is reduced by the purchase of inputs. The model can thus be
mterpreted as one where only one crop is grown with no purchased inputs, only own labour. It is
possible to extend the analysis to include other sources of income and purchased inputs, but at consider-
able cost of lost simplicity.
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If the demand elasticity is constant, a slight amount of destabilisation lowers
revenue (notice the sign change as we are now making transfers in the opposite
direction to reduce stability). A graph of average producer revenue against
stabilisation will be U-shaped, as in Fig. 3 below. In terms of average revenue
any amount of stabilisation will be unattractive unless complete stabilisation is
preferable to no stabilisation; that is, unless (with no demand risk)
EQp[EQ) > EQp.
For this to hold, revenue/>Q must be a concave function of sales, Q, which, if e
is constant, requires e > i. If, however, demand is inelastic, no amount of
stabilisation will raise producers' average revenue.
There remains the risk benefit, which is now
e Eu'
In this case the Taylor series expansion of a' gives
so the risk benefit is worth
^ Q (12)
and slight destabilisation increases the risk benefit, offsetting the transfer effect.
The net effect on producers is
whose sign depends on the magnitude of risk aversion, R. As expected, if pro-
ducers are very risk averse, slight destabilisation makes them worse off.
(3) The allocation of buffer profits
The conventional approach only distinguishes two parties affected by stabilisa-
tion, consumers and producers. This is reasonable when contrasting perfect
(costless) stabilisation with no stabilisation since at each extreme the buffer stock
makes no profits. With partial stabilisation this is no longer true, and it is some-
times convenient to preserve the simple dichotomisation between producers and
consumers to allocate buffer profits to one or other side. It seems more natural
to allocate them to producers, as the transfer term which appears in the con-
sumers' benefit is a transfer to producers and the buffer stock taken together. It
does, however, make a potentially substantial difference to the evaluation of the
producer benefits to include buffer profits, as can be seen by estimating them for
a small amount of stabilisation. Adding together equations (3) and (8) gives a
change in producer revenue of
when e is constant, which is positive if demand is elastic. Recall from equation (9)
that if buffer profits are not included, and the elasticity is constant, then the
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transfer effect is always negative. A small amount of destabilisation does not
generate any buffer profits, so the effect of stabilisation on producers' revenue is
as graphed below. The dotted lines include buffer profits, the continuous lines
exclude them.
Zero Degree of stabilisation Full
Fig. 3. The effect of stabilisation on product revenue.
III. THE SUPPLY RESPONSE TO STABILISATION
The previous section developed a method for analysing the impact of reduced
price dispersion on consumers, producers and the buffer stock on the assumption
of no supply response. As such, it is useful for studying the immediate impact of
any proposal, but it is obviously also important to examine the long-run effects,
allowing supply to respond. The central question is whether the long-run effects
are in the same direction as, or the opposite direction to, the short-run impact.
If they are in the same direction then the very general approach set out above
provides the appropriate qualitative guide, whilst if the long-run effect reverses
the^ short-run impact the analysis of price stabilisation becomes somewhat
delicate.
To model supply responses, it is necessary to become more explicit about the
choices facing the farmer and his decision criterion. In so doing, it becomes
possible to explore other questions, particularly the distributional consequences
of price stabilisation. It also becomes necessary to specify what is meant by the
degree of price stabilisation. The model is initially developed to study the effect
of price stabilisation when the source of price variability lies on the supply side,
but is extended to show how to analyse other schemes (such as income stabilisa-
tion) in the presence of demand as well as supply variability.
(i) A model of supply under price risk
We begin the analysis with the following simple model. Farmers grow only a
single crop. All farmers face identical, multiplicative production risk and have
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access to the same production possibilities, so that output per farmer, q, is a
linear^ stochastic function of input of effort, x:
q = Ox^ Ed = I,
where 6 is the random effect of weather, and the source of the randomness in
prices. Total output Q is thus
Q = dQ, Q = 'Lx, (14)
where Q is average output, the sum of individual farmer's average output, x.
Price is a stable function of the random total output,p(Q), and is hence random.
The welfare of the farmer depends both on his income, y, and the effort he has
expended, x:
The farmer chooses how much effort to supply before the weather is known and
aims to maximise expected utility, EU, wbich, for simplicity, is assumed to be
additively separable:
where u" < o, i.e. the farmer is risk averse.
Equation (15) implies that, for the individual farmer, income risk is also
multiplicative with the random factor pO, but obviously for society this is not
true. The individual farmer maximises expected utility taking the price distri-
bution as given, but he is aware that^ depends on 6, and that good weather with
high personal production will be associated with low prices. In short, farmers are
assumed to hold rational expectations, which Muth (1961) defines as those which
would be predicted by the relevant economic theory, given the information
currently available. The reason for this assumption is that we are interested in
the long-run supply response to stabilisation, once farmers have learnt how the
price distribution has changed. In the short run it is probably more appropriate
to assume that supply does not respond as in the previous section. Turnovsky
(1974) has discussed the case in which farmers form naive forecasts on the basis
of past observed prices, but the main difficulty in analysing such inefficient uses
of information lies in predicting how the inefficiencies will respond to a change
in the market environment. The reader is referred to Newbery and Sitglitz (1980)
for a more extensive discussion of these issues.
The farmer chooses input x, yielding average welfare W:
W =U.a:iL{Eu[p[dQ)ex'\-v{x)], (17)
so that ^
Eu'{y)pd = v'{x). (18)
This can be solved to find the farmer's supply of effort as a function of the price
distribution. A natural question to ask is how average output, Eq, depends on
the level of prices. (This is the nearest equivalent to a supply curve, for, with price
' Diminishing returns to effort and increasing disutility of effort are indistinguishable in thb model,
so we choose the simplest specification.
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variability, there is no longer any simple relationship between price and quantity
supplied.) For an individual farmer, if the whole price distribution shifts upwards,
then presumably he will wish to supply more. We can trace out a pseudo-supply
curve for the individual farmer by setting
p = XD{Q) = \D{Qd)
and allowing A to vary, holding Qconstant.^ If there is no production risk, this is
exactly the same as asking how supply will depend on price, or solving for q as
a function of price. The natural measure of the elasticity of supply, i?, is
_AdEq_Adx
Differentiate the logarithm of equation (i8) with respect to A:
xv" I dx , .
Eu'pd ~P~xdA' ^^°^
where
1 dy _i I dx
y dA A X dA'
Define the two elasticities R, y\









(2) Homothetic stabilisation schemes
A stabilisation scheme changes the probability distribution of prices corre-
sponding to a given distribution of outputs, so that the resulting price distribution
becomes
P = P{^>Q>^), (22)
where z is some parameterisation ofa family of stabilisation schemes, Q is average
output, and 0 describes the underlying source of risk (which here is a scalar). For
^ Note that D{Q} is the non-stochastic demand curve, and that prices vary because Q varies. Hence
the difficulty of relating average supply to 'the' price. The average price will be proportional to A.
' But see footnote i, p. 806 above.
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example, the simplest linear buffer stock rule would be to purchase all production
but to sell a more stable, weighted average of Q, Q, to consumers;^
Q^  = z Q + ( i - z ) Q = Q0(z) ( o < z < i ) . (23)
<P{z) =z-\-{i-z)d.
The consumer price would then be
A homothetic stabilisation scheme is one which allows the price to be expressed as
a product ofa riskless and a risky term:
p = g{Q,z)h{6,z). (24)
This implies that the percentage change in price for a given change in average
supply is independent of the value of the random variable d. The linear stocking
rule above gives a homothetic stabilisation scheme if the elasticity of demand is
constant, with g = Q~^ '^ , h = (/>~^'^. More generally, provided risk is multipli-
cative and demand of constant elasticity, it is always possible to design a homo-
thetic stabilisation scheme no matter what the source of the risk, or the objective
of the buffer (to stabilise prices or producer incomes).
Once the particular stabilisation scheme has been specified, equation (18) can
be solved to give the equilibrium supply of effort (and hence average output) as
a function of the level of stabilisation, z:
X = x{z).
Substituting this back into equation (17) gives the equiUbrium average welfare
as a function of z, W{z). Differentiate this totally with respect to z, and use the
envelope theorem (that dW/8x = o) to obtain
-^ = Eu'd-x. (25)
But, from equation (24), for a homothetic stabilisation scheme with an elasticity
of demand e,
Tz^'8^^'dQ'dz^'&'z~'^^'dz' ^^  '
Stabilisation has therefore two effects - a direct effect in changing prices in each
state of nature, measured by dp/dz, and an indirect effect, where stabilisation
affects effort, which affects average output Q, and hence price. Our basic question
is whether this indirect effect can reverse the direct (or short run impact) effect.
To answer this, differentiate the logarithm of equation (18) again, this time with
respect to z:
xdxj-RxEu'd {dp/dz) _ TJ dW
xdz~R + y xEu'dp ~xv'{x)dz' ^'^^'
• This may not be feasible ii Q < Q and stocks are too lov/. The possibility that stocks may run out
introduces an essential non-linearity which cannot be analysed in our framework. Instead the problem
must be reformulated in a dynamic context, see Newbery and Stiglitz (198a). Meanwhile we assume
adequate stocks for feasibility.
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substituting from equations (21), (25) and (18), and on the assumption that risk
aversion, R, is constant. Equation (27) gives a simple relationship between the
supply response, the elasticity of supply, 7}, and the welfare impact. For the
normal case of positive supply elasticity, when welfare is increased, supply
increases, confirming intuition.
Equations (26) and (27) can be combined to give
}_dx vi_dQ_ Eu'd{dp/dz)_ 7) dW
xdz eQdz"^ Eu'dp ~xv'{x)~dz' ^^^
provided that the elasticity of demand, e, is constant. If the supply characteristics
of all farmers are similar, this reduces to
which, when combined with equation (27), yields
e dW
dz e + ri 8z'
Provided the 'supply curve' (average supply as a function of scale shifts in the
demand curve) cuts the demand curve from below, the immediate and long run
impacts of price stabilisation are in the same direction. This proviso is, however,
just the condition for Walrasian stability, in a market with no uncertainty.^
(3) Tke effect on consumers
The relationship between the impact and long run effects on consumers is
particularly simple in the case of stable consumer demand, for, from equation (26),
dEVjp)_8EV{p) , dEV{p)dQ
The first term is the impact effect, the second is a transfer term corresponding
to the change in the average supply. If producers and consumers are weighted
equally, this will cancel out. A mean quantity preserving change in price dispersion
is thus all that is needed to value the impact on total welfare in this special case
(though it is inadequate to investigate the distributional impact). Roy's identity
can again be used to evaluate equation (30):
provided that Vj^ = o, or the marginal utility of income is roughly constant.
^ See Samiielson (1947, p. 260). The appropriate stability condition for markets with risk depends
on the formation of expectations about the whole of the probability distribution. (See Newbery and
Stiglitz, 1980.) It is, for instance, a more stringent stability condilion than cobweb stability conditions,
for, if not satisfied there would be monotonic departures from equilibrium.
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Thus the long run and impact effects on consumers may actually differ (e.g. if
producers respond by reducing supply because ofa fall in income).
(4) The evaluation of particular schemes
It is straightforward to evaluate a variety of stabilisation schemes, depending on
the source of the risk and the objective of the scheme. As an example, consider the
price stabilisation scheme of equation (23).
, 0 = z + (i -z) Oy
x = Eq = q. (32)
dz efj>
so
(5) A small degree of stabilisation
Ktz — o,(P = d^ and a Taylor series expansion of the right-hand side of equation




where a-"^ = E{0- i)^, the variance of 5. (That is, cris the coefficient of variation
of output.) Equation (33) is the same as equation (10), confirming the generality
of the result.





The supply response to a small amount of stabilisation is thus likely to be negative,
which explains why the long-run effect on producers is not so disadvantageous as
the immediate impact.
The immediate impact on consumers is the first term in equation (30) which
is positive
' ^ (35)
where X is expenditure and (T^ is the coefficient of variation of prices. The long-
run impact is given by equations (30) and (35) and is
which is positive or negative as i?(i — e) ^ e/2.
27 ECS 89
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The change in average buffer profits 7'' is found as follows. If
(36)
At z = 0 this reduces to
If these profits are attributed to producers equation (33) is replaced by
which could easily be of the opposite sign to that excluding profits.
(6) Small departures Jrom complete stabilisation
A.tz= i,(p= I,/» =j!>(Q) and the short-run impacts are approximately
——-=^^^' ^ (i - R) a^ > 0 if ?? > 0,




The supply response is
\dq^ ^
Qdz 6 + 7}^




At complete stabilisation the welfare impact and supply response are thus
typically in tbe opposite direction to tbose produced by a small amount of
stabilisation. The effect on buffer income is found from equation (36) setting
P = P{Q), constant, and 2 = 1 :
which, if attributed to producers, gives a short-run impact of
u oz e
exactly reversing the direction of the short-run impact.
IV. THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF
STABILISATION WITH DIVERSE PRODUCERS
Land holdings are typically very unequally distributed amongst farmers, and
it may therefore be very misleading to characterise the supply response to
stabilisation schemes in terms of a representative farmer. It is important to
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know whether farmers with different characteristics (like risk aversion) are
affected differently by stabilisation. Equations {25) and (26) give
dz 8z e qdz
Suppose most farmers are alike, and dominate in determining the supply response,
but a few are different. Let asterisks denote the dominant producers, and consider
a small degree of stabilisation.




It is evidently possible for more-risk averse farmers to be affected in the opposite
way to less-risk averse farmers, and even for the long-run impact on the non-risk
averse farmers to be in the opposite direction from the immediate impact.
V. DEMAND INDUCED VARIABILITY
The analysis follows closely along the lines of the previous section except now we
have to specify the nature of the stochastic variations in the demand functions
and the form of tbe stabilisation scheme. As an example, suppose that in addition
to the supply risk of the previous section the demand function is
Q'^ilfp-^, Exlf= I,
where ^ is a random factor (perhaps generated by variations in other prices,
or in income). A stabilisation scheme which sells
so that
p = (f/5)(i-^^ Q-<i/«)
is homothetic and as z varies from o to i gradually introduces complete price
stabilisation. The previous general formulae stand, except that
so that, for example,
Obviously the correlation between 6 and ^ will affect the outcome. If 5 = i
so that there is only variability in demand.
yu' 8z ^ ^ ^ ^ e2 •
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where a^ = Var i/r. This can also be expressed in terms of the remaining price
variability, o-^ (the coefficient of variation)
yu dz I — z
Income stabilisation schemes can likewise be analysed. Thus, if demand and
supply variability are as before, the buffer sells
Qc =
and farmer's income is then
VI. CONCLUSION
We have developed a very general theory of partial price stabilisation which
applies if mean supply does not change, and which illuminates the importance
of common simplifying assumptions about the shape ofthe demand schedule and
the source and nature of price variability. We then introduced the notion ofa
homothetic price stabilisation scheme to show how the supply response would
modify this initial impact in the context ofa more specific (but still fairly general
model). If risk is multiplicative and demand and utility functions have constant
elasticity the full impact of price stabilisation on identical producers is a simple
positive fraction ofthe immediate impact (before supply adjusts), the fraction
being e/ (e +17), where e is the elasticity of demand, and ij is the underlying supply
elasticity. If producers are not identical, then it is still possible to analyse the long-
runimpact, but variations in attitudes to risk will have distributional consequences.
The assumption of constant elasticity utility functions played a critical role
in the analysis. Elsewhere, we show that in the more general case, the short-run
and long-run impacts may differ not only quantitatively (as here) but also
qualitatively.
Our theoretical analysis has suggested that it may be difficult to assess the
desirability of buffer stock schemes without knowledge of certain critical para-
meters, such as the elasticity of effort response artd the elasticity of demand. We
showed how, with knowledge of these parameters, the benefits (possibly negative)
of price stabilisation, to both producers and consumers may be quantified.
Churchill College, Cambridge D. M. G. NEWBERY
All Souls College, Oxford j . E. STIGLITZ
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